Since 2016 terms such as "post-truth" or "alternative facts" have been symbolic for the 4 spread of evidence-absent political discourse. As decision-making absent actual facts is 5 dangerous, it is important to determine why people believe in conspiracies such as "large scale 6 voter fraud" (Trump, 2016a). In this study we showed that desires to dominate/fears of being 7 dominated (i.e., dominance motive) predicted conspiracy beliefs as voters faced challenges to 8 election-relevant cognitions (e.g., "we will win"; "we are superior"). We explained this by 
(e.g., Trump, 2016b Trump, , 2016c Trump, , 2016d . Contra overwhelming evidence (e.g., Bump, 2016; 25 Patterson, 2016), a majority of Trump's voters believed these conspiracies (Tamman, 2016).
26
As deliberately irrational/evidence-absent politics hinders informed decisions, understanding 27 why people believe in such conspiracies is vital (cf. Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016) . Previous we wanted to add to the ecological validity of such findings by utilising authentic conspiracy 32 beliefs in a real-life event (i.e., the 2016 US election). Moreover, as motives/desires strongly 33 reflect how much people value certain beliefs/actions (e.g., Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008) , 34 we investigated the predictive power of the dominance motive (DM).
35
Multiple theories hold that challenges to expected outcomes (e.g., the expectation to 36 win; Kruglanski et al., 2018) , group-identity (e.g., being the superior group/not being the losers; cognitive dissonance theory; Festinger, 1957 (i.e., we haven't really lost; we were cheated), group-identity (i.e., we are still great; the other 63 side was unfair), or world view (i.e., most Americans are like me; the statistics are rigged). Finally, we explored how differences among voters in dominance, prestige, and leadership Table 1 ). We also measured agreement to three additional excuses 94 for losing an election not explicitly offered by Trump but only included one of these items in our analysis (see Item 4 in Table 1 ).
1 All items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale from 96 "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree".
97
(Insert Table 1 and three additional excuses followed by standard demographic questions (i.e., age, gender, 108 occupation). Participants were not fully debriefed pre-election, only post-election, in case some 109 participated in both parts. We gave all participants an email address for any questions.
111

Results
112
Belief in election conspiracies
113
(Insert Table 2 here)
114
Cronbach's αs were sufficient across all measures, .70 < αs < .87, however, the 115 additional excuse item did not correlate with BEC, r(748) = -.09, p = .056 (see Table 2 ). We 
